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The relationships among "poverty," "welfare," and "the poor" have always
been some of the most controversial and misunderstood issues in American
social policy. Throughout history, American attitudes and opinions in this area
have changed greatly, largely reflecting shifts in who or what the enemy has
been perceived to be. Three major historical periods are discernible.
In the beginning, the poor were the enemy. Colonial Settlement and
Removal Laws enabled local officials physically to remove poor strangers from
their localities.1 In part, officials were concerned not only to forestall any
economic burden on their communities. In addition, however, they sought to
protect their citizenry from morally undesirable elements: an individual's
economic condition was presumed to reflect his moral character-or lack
thereof.2
After the Great Depression until the late 1970s, we fought various wars
on poverty.' The enemy was now the undesirable concomitant of an otherwise-
good economic system. Poverty, like a disease-causing germ, was an imperson-
al hazard that could strike anyone-even the virtuous-at any time.4 By attack-
ing the germ, policy makers hoped to eradicate the adverse social effects of
the disease.
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And in the 1980s, the Reagan Revolution brought the War on Welfare.
With Charles Murray's Losing Ground5 as battle cry and ammunition, conser-
vatives attacked the programs that had been much-praised weapons during the
wars on poverty.6 Our well-intentioned efforts to alleviate poverty through
government income transfers have not only failed to do so, they have exacer-
bated the problem. We have lost ground. The enemy is us.
America's Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduring
Realities by Theodore R. Marmor, Jerry L. Mashaw, and Philip L. Harvey,
is an eloquent, engaging, and highly persuasive counter-attack on the War on
Welfare. The book brings together three established experts on various govern-
ment income transfer programs. Professor Marmor has written extensively on
both Medicare and national health care policy. 7 Professor Mashaw is a leading
scholar of the Social Security Disability Program and, more generally, of
social welfare claims procedures Mr. Harvey has previously published a
book on unemployment programs.9
Their message in America's Misunderstood Welfare State is a self-pro-
claimed simple one: "America's social welfare efforts are taking a bum
rap."10 The authors' primary project, therefore, is to set the record
straight-to provide a careful, accurate, and well-reasoned account of both the
purposes and effects of American social welfare spending. As a second major
5. C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 (1984).
6. Murray's was neither the first nor (more surprisingly) the best selling of this genre. The most
notable precursor was George Gilder's Wealth and Poverty published in 1981, which was (unlike Murray's)
a best-selling Book of the Month Club selection. Gilder's book was, until Murray's, the "Bible of the
Reagan administration" on social policy. M. KATZ, supra note 3, at 143-44.
7. See, e.g., T. MARMOR, POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND AMERICAN MEDICAL CARE: ESSAYS (1983);
T. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE (1973); SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS
(T. Marmor & J. Mashaw eds. 1988); Marmor, Can the US. Learn from Canada?, in NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE: CAN WE LEARN FROM CANADA (S. Andreapoulos ed. 1975); Marmor & Klein, Cost v. Care:
America's Health Dilemma Wrongly Considered, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 19 (Spring 1986); Marmor, A New
Look at Nonprofits: Health Care Policy in a Conrpetitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313 (1986); Marmor,
Reflections on Medicare, 13 J. MED. & PHIL. 5 (1988).
8. See, e.g., J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS
(1983); J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985); J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F.
GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A
STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM (1978); SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND
THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS (T. Marmor & J. Mashaw eds. 1988); Mashaw, Administrative Due Process as
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for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981); Mashaw, Conflict and Corpromise Among Models
of Administrative Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J. 181; Mashaw, How Much of W7zat Quality? A Comment on
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task, Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey strive to explain, and thereby dispel, the
doom and gloom that pervade the "new consensus" on social welfare policy.
A third, and clearly subsidiary, project on their agenda is normative: they
suggest (sometimes merely hint at) various improvements in our social welfare
scheme that they believe would be consistent with the "set of enduring commit-
ments" that have shaped it."
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey are not the first to take on one or more of
these three projects since Losing Ground appeared in 1984. Scholars associated
with the Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty, for example, have
published several respected books, thick with data, that attempt to set the
record straight on the effects of American social welfare spending during the
last several decades.12 Explaining how and why the gloomy "new consensus"
on American social welfare policy came to be is also the topic of important
books by Michael Katz, 3 and by Fred Block, Richard Cloward, Barbara
Ehrenreich, and Frances Fox Piven. 4 And the most celebrated book to at-
tempt all three projects, albeit with a substantially narrower focus than Ame-
rica's Misunderstood Welfare State, is surely William Julius Wilson's The
Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy."
Even among this distinguished company, America 's Misunderstood Welfare
State makes an important contribution. The book provides a broad, persuasive,
and eminently readable rejoinder to the conservative War on Welfare. Other
parts of the book, unfortunately, are less successful due in part to the self-
defeating ambitiousness of the authors' agenda.
Part I of this review begins with a brief summary of Charles Murray's
attack on welfare, then sets out Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey's counter-
attack. Part II examines the intellectual centerpiece ofAmerica 'sMisunderstood
Welfare State: a descriptive theory and model of American social welfare
spending. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey's normative proposals are the focus
of Part I. The essay concludes by examining the authors' goal of creating a
rational national discourse on social welfare programs.
11. Id. at 31.
12. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey note that if one reads only these books, "much of what passes for
knowledge or fact in public debates concerning 'poverty' policies would rapidly be called into question."
Id. at 46 n. 16. See, e.g., FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T (S. Danziger & D.
Weinberg eds. 1986); D. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1988).
Pertinent pre-Losing Ground books by persons associated with the Wisconsin Institute for Research on
Poverty include A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMS: ACHIEVEMENTS, FAILURES, AND
LESSONS (R. Havemann ed. 1977); and R. PLOTNICK & F. SKIDMORE, PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: A
REVIEW OF THE 1964-74 DECADE (1975).
13. M. KATZ, supra note 3.
14. THE MEAN SEASON: THE ATTACK ON THE WELFARE STATE (1987).
15. Published in 1987.
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I. THE COUNTER-ATTACK
A. The War on Welfare
Although Charles Murray's Losing Ground was never a best-seller, 6 his
message has had extraordinary influence. One reason is easy enough to see.
Murray gave us what we have always, with varying degrees of embarrassment,
yearned for: freedom from wealth-inequality guilt. He provided an authoritative
"it's-for-their-own-good" argument that we and the White House could invoke
to explain our opposition to social welfare spending-an opposition that might
otherwise be considered heartless or selfish.
The foundation of Murray's argument is the "poverty/spending para-
dox."17 Although the U.S. spent far more "by many orders of magnitude"
on federal need-based cash assistance" during the 1970s than during the
1960s, poverty declined steeply between 1964 to 1968, and did not decline at
all during the 1970s." Murray and his cadre have used these numbers as the
central statistic in their war on welfare.
More damning still, according to Murray, are the statistics on "latent
poverty," the number of poor people before governmental cash transfers are
taken into account. Murray considers latent poverty a measure of economic
dependence because if one needs government transfers to stay above the
poverty line, one is not "standing on one's own abilities and accomplish-
ments. 2o Murray's statistics show that latent poverty decreased from approx-
imately one-third of the population in 1950 to 18 percent by 1968.21 Then,
as expenditures on need-based cash assistance began to increase markedly
during the 1970s, we saw a simultaneous growth in latent poverty: to 19
percent in 1972, 21 percent in 1976, and 22 percent by 1980.'
Murray's explanation for these statistics is that the social policy of the
1970s provided the poor many incentives to maximize various short-term gains,
which ensured and exacerbated their dependency. Murray claims more particu-
larly that changes between 1960 and 1970 in the laws governing Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) encouraged certain subsets of the
16. Losing Ground did not make the New York limes bestseller list in either hardcover or paperback.
Nonetheless, the publisher of Murray's next book, In Pursuit: Of Happiness and Good Government (1988),
described Murray on that book's cover as "author of the national best-seller Losing Ground."
17. C. MURRAY, supra note 5, at 56-58.
18. By "federal need-based cash assistance," Murray means the sum of the "Public Assistance"
category in the Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (less "Vendor Payments" and "Social Services," which are
in-kind) and the "Supplementary Security Income" category. According to Murray, "These capture the
cash programs that were most specifically intended for the poor . I." d. at 272 n.3.
19. Id. at 57-58.
20. Id. at 64-65.
21. Id. at 64.
22. Id. at 64-65.
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poor not to work, not to marry, to give birth to children out of wedlock, and
then not to put those children up for adoption.' By encouraging such choices,
according to Murray, the new AFDC laws increased, rather than eliminated,
recipients' continued need for welfare. He concludes that in order to do more
good than harm, our future social policy must incorporate, not ignore, "core
premises of the popular wisdom" of the 1980s, such as "People are not inher-
ently hard working or moral."24
Murray thus proposes that we consider "scrapping the entire federal
welfare and income-support structure for working-aged persons, including
AFDC, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Unemployment Insurance, Worker's Compen-
sation, subsidized housing, disability insurance, and the rest."' Murray
envisions great good resulting from a regime that "leave[s] the working-aged
person with no recourse whatsoever except the job market, family members,
friends, and public or private locally funded services."26 The working poor
will no longer be considered "fools" for working, but will "regain the status
that is properly theirs."27 Family and friends will be left with the choice of
supporting lazy young adults (and those adults' children), or prodding them
to get an education, find work, marry, and have fewer children.28 And the
needy who truly have no one else to turn to can seek help from the network
of local services.29 Although a large majority of the population would be
unaffected by this (or any other) income-support regime, Murray predicts that
"the lives of large numbers of poor people would be radically changed for the
better. "30
Enter Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey. Their counter-attack unsurprisingly
focuses on Murray's charge that our existing social welfare programs are
undesirable. But America's Misunderstood Welfare State does not limit its
rebuttal to such claims. Instead, the book persuasively describes the War on
Welfare as being fought on three fronts: unaffordability, ungovernability, and
undesirability. And Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey consider all three fronts
23. Id. at 154-66. To illustrate the incentives provided by these laws, and how they changed between
1960 and 1970, Murray presents a hypothetical young couple, Harold and Phyllis, who are poor, unmar-
ried, have high school educations, and are facing the birth of their first child. As Murray portrays the
couple, the AFDC laws dramatically affect many of their life decisions.
24. Id. at 146.
25. Id. at 227-28.
26. Id. at 228.
27. Id. at 229.
28. Id. at 228-29.
29. Id. at 229.
30. Id. Although obviously congenial, Murray's message alone did not ensure that Losing Ground
would become the "Bible of the Reagan administration" on social policy. M. KATZ, supra note 3, at 143-
44. The book's influence is, at least in part, attributable to the efforts of the conservative Manhattan
Institute. In addition to supporting Murray while he wrote Losing Ground, the Institute hired a public
relations expert to manage the "Murray campaign." This campaign included sending some 700 free copies
of the book to "influential politicians, academics, and journalists" (at a cost of $15,000), and organizing
a seminar on the book "with intellectuals and journalists influential in policy circles." Id. at 152.
Vol. 9:110, 1991
The Myth of the American Welfare State
worth defending. The statistical analyses the authors use for ammunition are
highly effective and constitute one of the book's important contributions.
B. Affordability, Governability, Desirability
According to America's Misunderstood Welfare State, the conservative
critics' claims that our welfare state is no longer affordable are typically based
on two premises: that welfare spending has grown dramatically over the past
two decades, and that the federal deficit could be significantly reduced by
cutting such spending.3 Closely linked to these charges of unaffordability are
the welfare warriors' accusations of ungovernability. Having opened the spigot
of social welfare spending, can we modulate the flow? How responsive is our
welfare state to larger, sometimes-unpredictable economic fluctuations and
crises?32 The issue of desirability is more complicated. It includes conserva-
tive claims that the increasingly poor performance of our national economy
is due to overspending on welfare programs," as well as Murray's charges
that "welfare" has actually exacerbated the problem of poverty by generating
"dependency."" 4 In combating these "myths" of unaffordability, ungovern-
ability, and undesirability, America's Misunderstood Welfare State marshals
impressive and persuasive evidence.
Regarding the affordability of our welfare state, Marmor, Mashaw and
Harvey concede that by any measure total federal social welfare spending has
increased dramatically since 1960. 3" Spending for AFDC, however, "the
program that most people equate with welfare, "36 has actually decreased by
any of those same measures.37 Indeed, AFDC currently accounts for less than
4 percent of total federal social welfare spending, and less than 2 percent of
the total federal budget.3" At less than two-fifths of one percent of GNP,
"welfare's" contribution to-and capacity to reduce-the federal deficit is both
small and diminishing.39
Even if "welfare" is more broadly defined to include all means-tested aid
to low-income persons-i.e., the far less controversial programs providing
educational assistance, job training, energy assistance, housing benefits, food
aid, and medical care, in addition to cash aid-"the total bill comes to only
about half the deficit total."'
31. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 84-96.
32. Id. at 75-78.
33. Id. at 58.
34. C. MURRAY, supra note 5, at 154-91.
35. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 84.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 85.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 86.
40. Id. at 95. Means-tested aid constitutes less than 30% of total social welfare spending. Id. at 94.
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Thus, both factual premises that underlie the popular unaffordability claim
are seemingly incorrect. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey attribute both inaccu-
racies to a common "tendency to equate 'welfare' with AFDC, to equate both
with the 'welfare state,' and to regard the latter as synonymous with 'antipov-
erty' programs."41
On the issue of governability, Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey concede that
recent Presidential aspirants have spoken as if "adjustments to the welfare
state, particularly those aspects dealing with the aged, were to be ruled firmly
off the public policy agenda for the foreseeable future. "42 History shows,
however, that our Presidents (and senators and representatives) usually "govern
better than they campaign."' Thus, even in the case of that most sacred
political cow, Social Security, the history is in fact one of incremental adjust-
ment: "Since 1935 the amendment process has been almost continuous in
Congress. ""
Nor has our welfare state been slow to respond even to unexpected fluctua-
tions in the health of our national economy. For example, during the economic
crisis that followed the 1973 oil crisis, the reduced growth in our gross nation-
al product was matched by reductions in social spending growth.45 Indeed,
from 1975 to 1981, "social expenditures and GNP grew at exactly the same
rate."' The authors emphasize that this welfare state responsiveness "was all
the more remarkable since deteriorating economic conditions meant that claims
on welfare state institutions were increasing. 47
This brings us to desirability. Can our progressively worsening national
economic performance be attributed to the welfare state? "No," say Marmor,
Mashaw, and Harvey. Although the American economy's average rate of
growth declined from 1973 to 1989, that "trend has not been caused by a
decline in growth rates across all phases of the business cycle."' Rather, "it
is associated with deeper recessions and the absence of wartime stimuli in
expansionary periods. " 41 In addition, comparative data indicate that there is
no consistent relationship between overall economic growth rates and either
the percentage of GNP spent on social welfare programs or the rate of growth
of social welfare expenditures." The authors note that these findings are
entirely predictable when one considers that social welfare spending consists
of transfer payments that simply redistribute claims on the economy's output.
41. Id. at 86.
42. Id. at 76.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 77.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 78.
48. Id. at 60.
49. Id.
50. ld. at 61.
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"The public has the same aggregate purchasing power after the transfer is
made as it did before. What is different is the relative size of individual claims
on total output."51
But there is another desirability issue that has been the central and best-
publicized concern of Murray and other conservative critics: Has social welfare
spending in fact made any headway against poverty? Marmor, Mashaw, and
Harvey warn that the answer is necessarily complicated. At the very least, the
answer depends on what is measured, how it is measured, and over what time
period.52 For example, between 1968 and 1988, total spending on means-
tested benefits for low-income persons increased from 1.9 percent of GNP to
3.6 percent.53 Census Bureau figures indicate that the incidence of post-transfer
poverty simultaneously fell from 22.2 percent in 1960 to 13.5 percent in
1988 . ' Almost all of that decline in the poverty rate occurred before 1973,
however,55 while the growth in means-tested spending was relatively con-
stant.56 Thus, between 1960 and 1973, increases in means-tested spending
were consistently matched by decreases in post-transfer poverty. We did not
lose ground during those years, we gained it. But from 1973 to 1988, increases
in means-tested spending were matched by a gradual edging-up of the poverty
rate from 11.1 percent to 13.5 percent.57
Why did the effectiveness of our anti-poverty efforts reach a plateau in
1970?"8 Does Charles Murray's "dependency" theory provide the explana-
tion? No. The "simple but bland truth," according to the authors, is that the
pre-transfer poverty rate stopped declining in 1970.'9 That is, the post-trans-
fer and pre-transfer poverty rates show a strong positive correlation. And three
broad economic factors explain virtually all of the increase in pre-transfer
poverty rates which has occurred in the United States since 1960: rising
average unemployment rates, an increase in the percentage of the population
in high-risk demographic groups (such as the aged), and a long-term trend
toward inequality in the distribution of market income.'
What about Murray's claim that "welfare" breeds dependency? Marmor,
Mashaw, and Harvey note first that such a claim is "enormously overgeneral.
Does he really mean that income transfers and other supports are causing
people to get old, to become blind or disabled, to need medical care?" The
51. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 96.
53. Id. at 94.
54. Id. at 97.
55. Id. at 10, 97-98.
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id. at 10
58. Id. at 98.
59. ld. at 112-13.
60. Id. at 114.
61. 1d. at 105.
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authors point out that "dependency" takes on a pejorative tone only when it
is used in connection with those we believe should be supporting them-
selves.62 Thus, they conclude that Murray can really be concerned only with
AFDC recipients.63 And they accuse Murray of using "latent poverty" inter-
changeably with "dependency" in order to mislead, "to justify a massive and
unnecessary sense of disquiet about our social welfare arrangements.""
Conservatives may also be troubled by the fact that Marmor, Mashaw, and
Harvey focus nearly exclusively on changes in the poverty rate when discuss-
ing the effects of welfare. What about the possible positive correlation between
increases in welfare expenditures and rising crime rates or increasing numbers
of single-parent households? Even if welfare makes the poor less poor, we may
nonetheless want less of it (or none) if it brings other social ills. Marmor,
Mashaw, and Harvey never directly confront this issue. But they do examine
unemployment and illegitimacy as two key indicators of welfare dependency.
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey note that AFDC spending does not appear
to be significantly positively correlated with either illegitimacy or unemploy-
ment. To take just two statistical examples: The illegitimacy rates in states with
very high AFDC payments are not significantly greater than in states with
lower payments.65 And the unemployment rate of young black men actually
fell as AFDC benefits increased in the late 1960s, and rose as the real value
of AFDC benefits declined over the 1970s.6
As America's Misunderstood Welfare State acknowledges, identifying these
trends and correlations (or their absence) will scarcely simplify social welfare
policymaking. But we can at least take comfort in the fact that our efforts to
relieve poverty do not appear to have been exacerbating it.67
A final issue remains. What accounts for the "poverty gap," the difference
between the pre-transfer incomes of the poor and the amount necessary to raise
all families to the poverty level? In 1987 (to take just one representative year),
the poverty gap was about $124 billion, while social welfare expenditures
totaled more than four and one half times that amount.68 Why do we tolerate
a welfare state that appears to be so "spectacularly inefficient"? 69 In response
to this question, Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey analyze the purposes of
American social welfare spending. One cannot, they remind us, evaluate the
efficiency or effectiveness of a social welfare program without knowing the
program's purpose.
62. Id. at 106.
63. Id. at 105.
64. Id. at 106.
65. Id. at 110.
66. Id. at 111-12.
67. Id. at 114.
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C. Conceptions of Purpose
The second major contribution of America's Misunderstood Welfare State
is its original and provocative thesis that "at least four fundamental conceptions
of purpose . . . co-exist, often uneasily, in the design of American social
welfare programs. "70 The implications of this thesis are central to the book's
argument: The elimination of poverty has never been the purpose of American
income transfer programs."
This latter claim, to be sure, is not original with Marmor, Mashaw, and
Harvey. Professors Piven and Cloward, to take perhaps the best-known
example, have long argued that the function and purpose of welfare is not the
alleviation of poverty, but rather the regulation of the poor. 2 The claim is
nonetheless worth repeating because welfare warriors like Murray have
asserted that "[r]educing poverty was the central objective of federal social
programs" during the years that the poverty-spending paradox was at its
worst. 73
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey therefore set out to combat a common form
of "critical myopia" in which social welfare programs are imagined "to have
single purposes that have somehow been lost in their implementation. ""' The
authors argue that our social welfare spending embodies, in various combina-
tions, four "visions" or "fundamental conceptions of purpose," which they
term "behaviorist," "residualist," "social insurance," and "populist. ""
The "behaviorist" conception views government transfer payments as
incentives aimed at "inducing the poor to behave in a more socially acceptable
manner. "76 The poor are thought to be poor "because they do not live as they
should,"' and the government must therefore take care not to encourage
"dependency" and various "suspect behaviors."78 The "residualist" concep-
tion embodies the notion of the "safety net." Notwithstanding its many bene-
fits, capitalism has victims who will sometimes need subsistence-level relief
in order to survive. "The net is close to the ground," and is large enough to
protect only the "truly needy."7 The "social insurance" view conceives of
the welfare state as a provider of economic security against illness, injury,
retirement, widowhood, and involuntary unemployment.80 It prevents those
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id. at 22-31.
72. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 2, at 3.
73. C. MURRAY, supra note 5, at 56.
74. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 22.
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 23-24.
78. Id. at 25.
79. Id. at 26.
80. Id. at 27.
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who contribute to our economy from ever becoming destitute, rather than
rescuing them after they have."' This view focuses on the "earned" rather
than the means-tested entitlement, and "[e]quitable treatment, not the equaliz-
ing of incomes, is the controlling standard."82 In contrast, the "egalitarian
populist" conception is primarily concerned with equalizing American incomes
and, therefore, with fundamental social and economic transformation by the
people, for the people.8 3
Appropriately, the authors do not claim ultimate originality for any of these
four fundamental conceptions of purpose. Indeed, they assert quite the oppo-
site: Each of these four conceptions embodies "a distinct ideological vision of
the welfare state and [each] tends to be preferred by certain political actors and
interest groups. "4 Nonetheless, in discussing the topic of purposes, America's
Misunderstood Welfare State makes three original and important contributions.
First, the authors separate, and thereby make visible, each of the four often-
conflicting strands of our social welfare policy. Second, they argue that these
purposes simultaneously coexist despite their inherent and irreconcilable
incompatibilities. "To aspire to a welfare state that is free of such inconsisten-
cies," they write, "is to reject political and social complexity."8' Third,
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey exhort us to remember that evaluating the
efficiency and success of our social welfare spending requires a criterion, a
clear understanding of its purposes.
II. THE AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY-INSURANCE STATE
Given their insistence that our social welfare programs inescapably express
political and social complexities, the reader is somewhat startled by the
authors' next move. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey claim to have discerned
"a more or less coherent set of enduring commitments" in "the jumble of
seemingly contradictory goals,"" and they proceed to divide all of our in-
come transfer programs into two straightforward categories. With this categori-
zation, the authors arrive at the descriptive theory that is seemingly intended
to be the intellectual centerpiece of their book. For purposes of prediction,
however, the theory proves to be more interesting than useful.
According to the authors, social welfare programs "either insure broad
strata of the nation's population against impoverishment from the loss of a
breadwinner's income, or they assist those whom opportunity has passed
81. Id. at 26-27.
82. Id. at 27.
83. Id. at 28-29.
84. Id. at 23.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 31.
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by." 7 Thus, Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey suggest the American "opportu-
nity-insurance state" as a more accurate and precise term than the Rorschach-
like "welfare state.""8 Its combination of economic opportunity and social
insurance "captures precisely the American political spirit," according to the
authors.89 "It harmonizes the Marlboro man with neighborly barn raising,
rugged individualism with mutual support. ""
The "insurance" prong of our opportunity-insurance state has always
dominated. At present, the vast bulk of all federal, state, and local social
welfare spending91 (71 %) is on "insurance" programs of which the principal
beneficiaries are the elderly: Social Security old-age pensions (28% of all
social welfare spending), Medicare (15%), old-age pensions for government
and railroad workers (9 %), Social Security survivors' benefits (7 %), worker's
compensation (5%), Social Security disability benefits (4%), and unemploy-
ment insurance (4%).92 Eligibility for these social insurance programs is
based on prior wages rather than a means test. Thus, their direct target is not
the poor, nor is their purpose income equalization. These programs instead are
"designed to help families maintain the security they have achieved through
productive work.""
"Opportunity" programs, by contrast, currently constitute only 29 percent
of all social welfare spending. These programs are based on need and typically
provide in-kind aid: 94 Medicaid and other medical benefits (10% of all social
welfare spending), food stamps and other food benefits (4%), AFDC (3%),
Supplemental Security Income (2.5 %), other cash aid (2 %), housing benefits
(3 %), educational loans and special programs (2 %), jobs and training (0.7 %),
and social services (0.9%)."5 To varying degrees, these programs constitute
the "safety net" that protects Americans from destitution, if not poverty.96
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey note, however, that "[I]f ensuring a minimally
adequate income for all were the primary focus of American social welfare
policy outside the domain of social insurance, it could have been pursued more
readily by other means"-most obviously a straightforward negative income
tax.9 7 Here, too, according to the authors, the actual programmatic goal is
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 22, 31, 43-46.
89. Id. at 43.
90. Id.
91. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey use 1986 statistics, the most recent then available. See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (1989).
92. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 32, 36-37.
93. Id. at 34.
94. ld. at 35.
95. Id. at 36-37.
96. Id. at 38-43.
97. Id. at 38.
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more subtle: To "create opportunities for all Americans to become productive
citizens" by investing in their human capital.98
Although there is no glaring flaw in the authors' categorization of programs
or in their notion of "insurance," their conception of "opportunity" rings
startlingly hollow. If we truly wanted to "create opportunities for all Ameri-
cans to become productive citizens," would we not have some modern ana-
logue of the Works Progress Administration to provide work for the able-
bodied for whom there would not otherwise be a job in our economy? And
would we not have some form of national health insurance as the most funda-
mental investment in our citizens' human capital?
Both gaps are acknowledged by Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey," and
they attribute them to some combination of conservative political interests and
Americans' preference, under unspecified circumstances, for limited govern-
ment. 1" Well, all right. But this critical addition to the authors' entirely
interesting descriptive theory seems to diminish almost completely its predictive
force and usefulness. Apparently, when our preference for social welfare
spending overcomes our preference for limited government, that spending will
be channeled toward "insurance" programs or "opportunity" programs. But
when our preference for limited government is strong enough, it overrides our
preference for certain kinds of social welfare spending.
Despite the predictive weakness of their descriptive theory, the authors
seemingly take great pride in it. For the very last sentence of America's
Misunderstood Welfare State is presented as an apparently triumphant restate-
ment of the theory: Our existing social welfare programs "reflect our enduring
commitments to social insurance and equal opportunity, while recognizing that
we are also committed to individualism, the market, and limited govern-
ment. "101
III. IMPROVING THE OPPORTUNITY-INSURANCE STATE
The authors of America's Misunderstood Welfare State warn in their
preface that readers may miss the normative, reformist part of their message
because, unlike other commentators, they do not ground their reform ideas on
"a castigation of existing programs. "102 There is, however, a second, equally
important reason for the low visibility of the authors' reform proposals:
affirmative reforms are in fact given very few words in America's Misunder-
stood Welfare State. The authors claim that theirs is "not an argument for the
98. Id. at 39.
99. Indeed, they devote the whole of Chapter Six to the need for, and the feasibility of, filling the
health insurance gap within the opportunity-insurance state.
100. Id. at 44-46.
101. Id. at 241.
102. Id. at xiv.
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status quo,"" °3 and assure us that they "are not so naive as to believe that
the status quo represents the best of all possible worlds." 'O Nonetheless,
much of the time the authors' normative message is couched as an essentially
defensive response to Murray-style welfare warriors who would eliminate
programs, tighten eligibility requirements, and otherwise reduce social welfare
spending. And at other times the authors seem only to pretend to have a
normative message.
Early on, Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey suggest that the political strength
of conservative ideology "has been sufficient to hedge the American welfare
state within narrower bounds than its guiding principles would seem to dic-
tate."105 Despite their further explicit assessment that our "guiding princi-
ples" would permit some form of work relief, the authors inexplicably never
propose that we fill that obvious gap in our complex of opportunity-insurance
programs. They simply note that a Works Progress Administration no longer
exists even though "a straightforward way to guarantee economic opportunity
is to guarantee jobs."" And they attribute this gap, as we have seen, to
inevitable political compromise as well as to the public's preference, at least
under some circumstances, for limited government."°
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey's seeming lack of interest in any form of
work relief is puzzling for two further reasons. First is the large role that a
robust (but not yet programmatically realized) notion of "opportunity" plays
in their descriptive model of our welfare state. The more intriguing reason,
however, is that Philip Harvey has recently published a book in which he
proposes an American "employment assurance policy." 108 Although Harvey
concluded in that book that "it is probably unrealistic to expect the right to
employment to be secured in the United States any time soon," he nonetheless
also argued (for 88 of the book's 117 pages) that "a practical program to
secure the right to employment is both feasible and desirable."' °9 One won-
ders: Does Harvey no longer find his elaborate 1989 proposal worth mention-
ing? Did his co-authors resist its inclusion in any form, although mention of
the proposal (as with each other proposal the authors mention) could surely
have been followed by the reasons why it is ultimately politically unfeasible?
This failure to discuss unemployment weakens the authors' prescriptive mes-
sage.
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey do discuss at varying lengths three specific
areas for affirmative reform: child poverty, Social Security, and medical care.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 50.
105. Id. at 44.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. P. HARVEY, supra note 9, at 5.
109. Id. at 7.
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In each instance, however, the discussion is quickly slowed, then halted, by
the authors' own pessimism about the feasibility of their proposal. For exam-
ple, their normative discussion of the interrelated problems of child poverty
and "the underclass" begins, "[tihis is not the place even to attempt to specify
a grand strategy for coping with the underclass."110 Yet they state in the
following paragraph, "[Ilt may be that we should think of birth in disadvan-
taged circumstances as one of the risks against which the welfare state should
provide insurance."" t' Then, with the very next sentence the authors shift
their focus to the Family Support Act of 1988 and, ultimately, why "it is
unlikely to ameliorate the condition of the core underclass." tt2
That Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey devote so little of their normative
attention to the problem of child poverty and the underclass is surprising in
light of their proclaimed belief that "This is clearly not a group of Americans
for whom the welfare state has attempted to do a great deal."'3 Indeed, they
state that "to provide no exit from intergenerational cycles of poverty. . . is
to deny one of the fundamental principles of our insurance-opportunity
state."14 Perhaps the authors simply had nothing to add to William Julius
Wilson's authoritative study of, and proposal for alleviating, the problem of
the underclass." 5 In any case, this lack of discussion calls into further ques-
tion the robustness of the authors' descriptive notion of "opportunity." And
one wonders all the more why Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey resist proposing
that we fill the visible programmatic gaps in our "opportunity-insurance state."
The authors' suggestions for reform of the Social Security program are
more specific and better supported than those for child poverty and the under-
class. As before, however, their (arguably rational) pessimism quickly takes
over. For example, they advocate changes in the tax treatment of Social
Security benefits, such as including Social Security benefits in the definition
of taxable income in order to achieve greater social equity and help reduce the
federal deficit. 16 They suggest that "Congress could increase tax revenues
without unfairly burdening the least secure among the elderly by lowering or
eliminating the income threshold above which Social Security benefits are taxed
or by increasing the fraction of benefits subject to taxation."17 They quickly
note, however, that the appeal of such tax reform proposals is (perhaps fatally)
110. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 115-16.
111. Id. at 116.
112. Id. at 119.
113. Id. at 116.
114. Id.
115.. It is interesting, however, that Wilson's 1987 award-winning book, The Truly Disadvantaged:
The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy is nowhere mentioned in America's Misunderstood
Welfare State.
116. Id. at 169-70.
117. Id.
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limited because "most Americans perceive their contributions to the Social
Security trust funds as coming out of already taxed income.""'
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey are at their normative best and most
persuasive when discussing medical care. Indeed, this is the only programmatic
gap in our "opportunity-insurance state" that they explicitly propose that we
fill. Consistent with Marmor's earlier writings, 19 they suggest that we adopt
a national health insurance scheme based on the Canadian model. Perhaps
because they acknowledge that the Canadian scheme undeniably works (at least
in Canada),12° they are relatively optimistic about this one of their reform
proposals. Before too many paragraphs pass, however, the authors revert to
their familiar pessimism: "The politics of medical care in the United States has
traditionally favored free market ideology. . . . Only a substantial change in
politics as usual could produce major reform.... We are hardly sanguine that
such reforms will be forthcoming in the near term."12 A sentence later,
however, the authors claim that there is actually cause for optimism..
One can partially understand this lack of development and detail in the
authors' reform proposals. Genuinely new affirmative proposals that would
be worthy of extended and detailed discussion are not easily come by in the
realm of social welfare policy. In addition, the authors' stated agenda was
largely descriptive rather than normative: even the book's title promises, not
a vision, but a clarifying description. The authors' goal was to clear the
deck-not to build a new ship.
Perhaps most important, however, the authors' constructive posture toward
the existing scheme of social welfare spending necessarily makes normative
theorizing more difficult and complicated. Charles Murray could spell out his
"Proposal for Public Welfare" in only two sentences because it had a simplici-
ty only negative proposals can ever have: "[S]crap[] the entire federal welfare
and income-support structure for working-aged persons .... [And] leave the
working-aged person with no recourse whatsoever except the job market,
family members, friends, and public or private locally funded services." '2
There is a second issue here, however, embodied in the fact that Marmor,
Mashaw, and Harvey warn the reader in the book's preface to be suspicious
of their normative message. "[T]hose who want to dismantle the welfare state
will heap scorn on it," the authors note. "But it is both unnecessary and
counterproductive for those who want to strengthen the welfare state to do the
same."12 As the authors surely realized, even reform proposals intended to
"strengthen" rather than "dismantle" the welfare state heap some measure of
118. Id. at 171.
119. See, e.g., Marmor, Can the U.S. Learn from Canada?, supra note 7.
120. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 204.
121. id. at 209.
122. C. MURRAY, supra note 5, at 227-28.
123. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at xiv.
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implied scorn on the existing arrangement. Thus, reformist suggestions that
more than minor tinkering with the present system is in order could undermine
their own powerful counter-attack on the War on Welfare. So, in the end, we
should not be surprised that the authors' normative message lacks force. All
the same, the reader is disappointed not to have received a strong, crisp
statement of the authors' normative views.
IV. TOWARD A RATIONAL DIscouRsE
Throughout its battle against the War on Welfare, America's Misunderstood
Welfare State does a largely persuasive job of attacking the central enemies
of myth and misperception. The most pernicious enemy, however, may be the
rhetoric that sells this misinformation to the public. Although it is one of the
welfare state's more abundant "goods," public misinformation matters in a
democracy. "If reform must be marketed in terms of dominant misconceptions,
certain things are both unthinkable and undoable."' 24 Mistaken ideas can lead
not only to mistaken policies,"2 but ironically also to social insecurity in the
face of actual economic security. 126
The authors describe the social commentary from the mid-1970s through
the mid-1980s as a "chorus of complaint[s]" about what social welfare spend-
ing (allegedly) had not achieved and, more generally, about the (alleged)
ineffectiveness of government social action. 127 How and why did negativism
become the conventional wisdom during these years? After all, the facts evince
much accomplishment and cause for pride. And public opinion concerning the
specific major programs of the American welfare state was-and is-consis-
tently and overwhelmingly positive. 2 For example, one of the most exten-
sive recent surveys of public attitudes toward American social welfare pro-
grams found that the percentage of respondents who wished either to increase
or maintain expenditures for existing programs ranged from 97.5 percent for
Medicare to 75.6 percent for the Food Stamp Program.1 29
Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey offer several plausible explanations for the
negative conventional wisdom of the 1970s and 1980s. First, during the late
1960s and early 1970s, the American Left had unintentionally supported later
conservative positions by encouraging "a cynical view of antipoverty pro-
grams." 30 Most notably, two widely read and influential books appeared in
the early 1970s that argued that American welfare programs had never been
124. Id. at 214.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 173-74.
127. Id. at xiii-xiv, 1-2.
128. Id. at 2, 47-49.
129. Id. at 47-48.
130. Id. at 14.
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motivated by humanitarian concern or a desire to end poverty. In their 1971
book, Regulating the Poor, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward claimed
that welfare was a nefarious instrument of social control: "[E]xpansive relief
policies are designed to mute civil disorder, and restrictive ones to reinforce
work norms.""' And in 1975, James O'Connor argued in The Fiscal Crisis
of the State that America had become a "warfare/welfare state." 32 Military
and social welfare spending provided the imperial power, social control, and
fiscal stimulus upon which America had come to depend for its prosperity, but
could no longer afford.
A second explanation is that from 1974 until the early 1980s, the U.S.
economy suffered its worst recession since the 1930s. 133 Because that eco-
nomic downturn followed on the heels of the Great Society and the War on
Poverty, a causal fallacy awaited exploitation. At the same time, political
leaders were beginning to exalt rugged individualism, family, voluntary
associations, and the market. 134 Conservative critics were poised to prey
upon the public's growing unease that the welfare state was synonymous with
government profligacy and constraints on freedom. 131
Also during the 1970s, unprecedented amounts of financial support for both
the generation and dissemination of conservative critiques appeared. 136 Con-
servative academics were therefore happy to provide scholarly analyses of
social welfare spending and set the intellectual foundation for the war on
welfare. And conservative commentators and editors ensured that policymakers
and the public were regularly fed easily digestible morsels of this scholar-
ship. 137 Meanwhile, according to Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey, "much
truly fine research on the problems and prospects of American social welfare
policy" was not circulated beyond the specialist policy community. 138
One wants to know why not. The authors' passing suggestion that "[1]iber-
alism was whipsawed" 139 for an entire decade by earlier left-wing criticisms
of the welfare state is not a very satisfying explanation. Surely in the 1980s
there were commentators and editors inclined toward the "L-word" who could
have distilled and popularized this other (presumably less conservative) re-
search. Who or what stopped them? Money? The ideological tenor of the
times? Lack of conviction? Lack of interest? That the authors do not really
attempt to answer this question is especially odd in light of their repeatedly
131. F. PIVEN AND R. CLOWARD, supra note 2, at xiii.
132. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 14.
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id. at 15-16. See supra note 30 for a disscussion of the efforts of the Manhattan Institute to
promote Losing Ground.
137. Id. at 15.
138. Id. at 51-52.
139. Id. at 15.
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expressed concern with how popular misunderstandings about American social
policy emerge.
Other scholars have attempted to answer this question. To take just one
example, Michael Katz has recently suggested two highly plausible reasons
why no liberal response to the conservative welfare critiques of the 1980s was
quickly forthcoming, let alone broadly circulated. First, the "capture" of
poverty issues by economists and the new breed of public policy analysts meant
that liberals could not construct a fresh defense of the welfare state using the
materials on which they had so effectively relied during the Welfare Revolution
of the 1960s: "new definitions of rights and entitlements, emergent conceptions
of distributive justice, ethnographic data about poor people, and revised
historical and political interpretations of poverty and welfare. ""
Second, Katz notes that the liberals failed "to relate an invigorated welfare
state to economic and moral renewal." The liberals "lacked a plausible re-
sponse to the intuitively interconnected problems troubling ordinary Americans:
stagflation; declining opportunity; increased taxes and welfare spending; crime
and violence on the streets; and the erosion of families and moral stan-
dards. " '1 For the conservative critics, on the other hand, "welfare" provided
a convincing interpretation for these manifold worries of the typical American:
"Welfare became the centerpiece of [the conservative] explanation for econom-
ic stagnation and moral decay."42
No matter who its audience might be, a single chapter of America's
Misunderstood Welfare State is unlikely to remedy the problem of persuasion
that liberals now face. Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey clearly understand this,
even though their book concludes with a chapter, seemingly aimed at "the
public," titled "How Not to Think About the Welfare State." In the chapter's
early pages, the authors display their recurring pessimism about the feasibility
of even this reform proposal. "People believe what they want to believe," they
sigh, "and no amount of haranguing by well-intentioned fact-grubbers is likely
to change their minds."143 More persuasive (and quotable) still: "[Tihe
American public is not going to be converted overnight from sports fans into
policy analysts." 1" One begins to think that the authors have given up their
project of trying to dislodge American ideology from the iron grip of Murray-
ite welfare warriors.
But Marmor, Mashaw, and Harvey survive even this last paroxysm of
pessimism: "[W]e are not yet ready to throw in the towel." 45 And they
140. M. KATz, supra note 3, at 139.
141. Id. at 139.
142. Id.
143. WELFARE STATE, supra note 10, at 216.
144. Id. at 215.
145. Id. at 216.
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provide a set of rules-"likely policy-analytic blunder[s] 1 "-that they hope
will enable "concerned citizens [to] protect themselves in a policy dialogue that
too often features nonsense in place of sense." '47 Their plan is to "induce
our readers to adopt a reflexive skepticism when confronted with certain
varieties of unhelpful social welfare policy talk."148 The rules are pithy:
Rule 1: Projections are not forecasts.
Rule 2: Incentives are not behaviors.
Rule 3: Purposes are never unitary.
Rule 4: Comprehensive reform is usually not on the agenda.
Rule 5: Ideology drives analysis.
But how useful do you find these rules? And is the more ordinary American
likely to be helped by them?
V. CONCLUSION
America's Misunderstood Welfare State is required reading for both the
policy expert and the concerned citizen. Its statistical and analytical counter-
attack on the War on Welfare is excellent and compensates for weaknesses
elsewhere in the book. One hopes only that its nuanced, scholarly timbre will
not diminish the audibility of the collective voice of Marmor, Mashaw, and
Harvey "in a public world in which to be shrill is to be heard. "",4
The somewhat less successful parts of the book are largely victims of the
ambitious scope of the authors' agenda. Some endeavors simply do not com-
bine well with others within the confines of the same book. And 241 pages is,
after all, not a very big book in which to attempt a panoply of projects.
Reform proposals are a difficult follow-up to a highly persuasive defense of
the existing system. The hows and whys of our ever-changing "conventional
wisdom" on social welfare is a topic to which entire books have been devoted.
And teaching the American public how to think is a project that is probably
best left undeclared, even when attempted. Nonetheless, America's Misunder-
stood Welfare State extends a strong and needed "hand up" to the national
discourse on the state of our welfare state.
146. Id. at 20.
147. Id. at 20-21.
148. Id. at 20.
149. Id. at 51.
